Robert C. Roberts, EMOTIONS: AN ESSAY IN AID OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY by Snow, Nancy E.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 21 Issue 3 Article 10 
7-1-2004 
Roberts, EMOTIONS: AN ESSAY IN AID OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Nancy E. Snow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Snow, Nancy E. (2004) "Roberts, EMOTIONS: AN ESSAY IN AID OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 21 : Iss. 3 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss3/10 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 399 
2. Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material 
World (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
3. William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999). 
4. Lynne Rudder Baker, Saving Belief: The Case Against Physicalism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
5. For an attempt of this kind, see my C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: A 
Defense of the Argument from Reason (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity 
Press, 2003). 
Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, by Robert C. Roberts. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 357. $70.00 (Cloth), $25.00 (Paper). 
NANCY E. SNOW, Marquette University 
This book is the first part of a projected two-volume study of the emotions 
and their place in moral personality. The volume is ambitious, densely 
written, and thoroughly argued. Since Roberts' primary concern is to use 
conceptual analysis to elucidate the nature and moral import of emotions, 
in chapter one he defends conceptual analysis against critics. In chapter 
two, he develops his own theory of the nature of emotions. He applies the 
theory to many particular emotions in chapter three. Chapter four closes 
the book with an exploration of assorted topics, such as error in emotion, 
emotions and feelings, emotions and the self, true and false emotions, emo-
tions and literature, and emotional education. 
In chapter one, Roberts describes conceptual analysis as " ... particular-
ly based on collection of and reflection about examples from everyday 
human life, many of which can only be understood in the light of a fairly 
rich narrative background" (p. 5). He defends this method of understand-
ing emotions against two lines of attack, one from Amelie O. Rorty and 
another from Paul E. Griffiths (among others). The upshot of the 
labyrinthine analysis of Rorty's view is that emotion is a wide-ranging and 
complex topic. According to Roberts, a useful understanding of emotion 
should explain why some concepts, such as anger and fear, are paradigm 
cases of what English speakers regard as emotion, whereas notions like 
surprise and startle are marginal cases (see p. 14). 
An examination of the second line of criticism of conceptual analysis fol-
lows the laborious treatment of Rorty. The second criticism comes from 
those who believe that emotion should be understood in scientific terms. 
Roberts' arguments about purely scientific analyses of emotions are gen-
uinely helpful in ferreting out useful methodological approaches to a truly 
complex topic. Roberts' arguments lead him to the commonsense conclu-
sion that emotions are best studied from a variety of disciplinary angles 
(see p. 36). Though Roberts endorses conceptual analysis, he is also aware 
of its limitations (see pp. 57-9). 
In chapter two, he uses conceptual analysis to develop his own theory of 
emotions. Before turning to the substance of the view, two preliminary 
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points are in order. First, Roberts offers a disclaimer of sorts by calling his 
view an 'understanding,' as opposed to a 'theory' of the emotions (see p. 
182). This seems a trifle disingenuous, for he clearly intends his "under-
standing" of emotion to compete with other philosophical theories of emo-
tion. His "understanding" is theory-like in several respects: he argues that 
it's superior to other "theories," such as various views about the roles that 
judgments play in emotions; he develops terminology specific to his view; he 
offers "paradigm cases" of emotions that are well explained by his approach; 
and acknowledges that some emotions are not fully captured by his outlook. 
Second, the style of the first few sections of chapter two is tedious. The 
first section begins with a dozen facts about emotion. These are numbered 
E1-E12. In the important section on construals, the reader encounters nine 
numbered sections, and a summary of twelve important points about con-
struals, numbered C1-C12. One of the sections on judgments contains fea-
tures of the nature of judgments, numbered J1-J6. Perhaps these lists were 
an attempt by the author to communicate efficiently, but the reader is 
grateful to see them disappear as chapter two progresses. 
According to Roberts, emotions are concern-based construals (see p. 79). 
He writes: "A construal is a perceptual event or state in which one thing is 
grasped in terms of something else" (p. 76). A construal is a construction 
of various elements (see p. 78), or a characterization of how objects present 
themselves (see p. 80). Later Roberts indicates that emotions are a subclass 
of construals, or a certain kind of construal (see p. 101). Though he argues 
against the views that emotions are constituted by judgments or require 
judgments, he contends that many, though not all, emotions have proposi-
tional content (see p. 107ff). He writes: 
A sentence expressive of an instance of emotion and referring to the 
particular items in the emotion's situational object I will call the emo-
tion's material proposition. The various material propositions expres-
sive of instances of a given type of emotion (say, resentment or nos-
talgia) should have a form in common. A sentence expressing this 
form I will call an emotion's defining proposition (p. 110; italics his). 
An example is the defining proposition for anxiety: "X vaguely presents an 
aversive possibility of some degree of probability; may X or its aversive conse-
quences, whatever they may be, be avoided" (p. 110; italics his). 
Material propositions of a construal can depict valuational features of a 
situation. This, however, is not enough for a construal to be an emotion. 
According to Roberts: "Insofar as the material proposition is that of an emo-
tion, its value elements must express a concern of the subject, and this con-
cern has to connect with or enter into the rest of the construal as one of its 
terms" (p. 111; italics his). 
What, then, are concerns? The answer is neither simple nor entirely 
clear. Roberts claims: "I use 'concern' to denote desires and aversions, 
along with the attachments and interests from which many of our desires 
and aversions derive. Concerns can be biological ('instinctive') or learned, 
general or specific, ultimate or derivative, and dispositional or occurrent" 
(p.142). Some concerns are desires, but some aren't (see p. 143). Moreover, 
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there can be basic concerns and consequent concerns; bipolar concerns and 
unipolar concerns (see p. 144). Basic concerns are what Roberts calls 
"exogenous" causes of emotions, that is, causes that are not parts or aspects 
of an emotion (as opposed to "analytic" causes of emotion, which are part 
of the experience of the emotion; see p. 133). Yet basic concerns can also be 
"taken up" into a construal, to become part of an emotion. 
Roberts deploys other technical notions, such as the idea of a "term" of a 
construal, in the explanation of his view. These ideas are complex and, at 
times, elusive, and he rightly spends considerable time and effort sifting 
through them. The concept of a concern, so crucial to his understanding of 
emotion, is especially hard to pin down, but essen1.ial to Roberts' view of 
emotion as both conative and cognitive (see p. 178). 
Chapter three is a lengthy analysis of specific emotions. The main task is 
to identify defining propositions for emotions and emotion types. Roberts 
recognizes that some of the defining propositions he identifies are debatable 
(see p. 192; p. 218). For example, the defining proposition for anger has a lot 
of embedded cognitive and evaluative content: "5 has culpably offended in the 
important matter of X (action or omission) and is bad (is to some extent an enemy of 
what is good); I am in a moral position to condemn; 5 deserves (ought) to be hurt for 
X; may 5 be hurt for X" (p. 204). To me, this seems more appropriate as defin-
ing justifiable anger than as defining anger in general. Further, one would 
think that defining propositions of similar or closely related emotions 
would be similar in form and content. Yet, the defining propositions of 
resentment and an emotion that he calls "impersonal resentment" differ not 
only in form but also in content, since resentment expresses a desire to hurt 
some culpable offender, whereas "impersonal resentment" does not express 
the desire to harm, but the desire to be compensated by some presumably 
culpable "System" (see pp. 214-15). 
A deeper issue, I believe, is that the content of defining propositions 
seems heavily culturally influenced and thus, culturally relative. Roberts 
addresses this concern by asking whether emotions found among the 
Haluk and Ilongot (groups living near or in the Philippines) are fear or 
anger. His general conclusion is that his approach to emotions can help us 
to understand when emotions found in other cultures correspond to emo-
tions found in ours, and when they differ. This is useful, provided that the 
defining propositions of emotions found in our culture are accurate and 
can be reasonably generalized across cultures. 
Chapter four concludes the volume with an examination of assorted 
topics. They include, among others, the distinction between emotions and 
feelings - the feeling and the emotion are two aspects of one mental state 
(see p. 60; p. 322) - an explanation of the difference between true and false 
feelings, and truth criteria for feelings. Some of the arguments presented 
in this chapter seem counterintuitive. For example, in his treatment of false 
feelings, Roberts claims: "On this book's account of emotion a construal is 
not an emotion unless it is based on an appropriate concern ... " (p. 330). 
This invites the question, "What counts as an appropriate concern?" It is 
difficult for the reader to arrive at a clear answer. Roberts suggests that an 
appropriate concern results in motivation, at least for some emotions, such 
as indignation (see p. 330; pp. 335-36). He writes: "Thus lack of proper 
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motivation is, for these emotions, a strong indicator that the emotion itself 
is absent. If the individual feels it, nevertheless, the feeling is a sham" (p. 
330). I find this puzzling. Why can't someone feel mildly indignant over 
some slight, yet remain unmotivated to act, perhaps because of resignation 
or forbearance? I would say that such indignation is mildly felt, yet gen-
uine - not a sham. 
Readers can judge for themselves the merits of Roberts' positions. Let 
me conclude with a final observation. I found several of his examples to be 
politically charged and, at times, offensive. For example, in discussing 
anger, he tells a (presumably imaginary) story about a colleague suggest-
ing that Roberts be given last choice of upper division courses because 
Roberts is II ••• nothing but a middle-aged white protestant male ... " (p. 
60). A woman's unusual rage at a man is explained by reference to her 
monthly menstrual cycle - this is supposed to illustrate that emotions pre-
suppose a background of normal neurochemical functioning (see p. 134). 
Horror is illustrated by asking the reader to consider II A wastebasket of 
human fetuses, some whole and some in parts ... " (p. 202). He continues: II 
... it is even more horrifying if one of them is still moving" (p. 202). 
Perhaps I am being too sensitive about these examples (my monthly 
cycle?), but their content distracts the reader from Roberts' main points, 
which could easily have been made using other cases. To me, these illus-
trations mar an otherwise impressive philosophical contribution. 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions by Martha C. 
Nussbaum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 751 pages, inc. 
index. $39.95, cloth. 
GENE FENDT, University of Nebraska 
"'Is that what grief is, then?" I said, II A malfunction?"'! 
Upheavals of Thought is as long and varied as a Russian novel. Fortunately, 
one does not have to read it straight through for fear of losing track of the 
characters. Fruitfully, I took up the assignment of this review at the same 
time that I picked up David Lodge's novel, Thinks ... , in which a female nov-
elist, Helen Reed, is dealing, as Professor Nussbaum while writing her 
book, with that emotion-lisa excessive, so disproportionate to any possible 
evolutionary payoff" (Lodge, 69)-we pin down in the five letters of grief. 
Helen Reed faces her grief against a former philosopher entirely trans-
formed into an adulterous director of an AI institute. Martha Nussbaum 
faces hers in the company of the Stoics and Proust, Joyce and Whitman, 
and against Plato, Dante, Augustine and others. The Lodge novel and the 
scholarly book make the reader consider several thought experiments from 
quite different angles; the novel performs, the scholarly book represents 
and argues; I ruminate: perhaps the scholarly book performs as well .... 
Nussbaum's continuing project is to develop and implement what she 
calls a "cognitive/evaluative" theory of the emotions (3), a theory which, 
II accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality" (129) will show how 
